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VOLUNTARY ACTS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW: 
JUSTIFYING CULPABILITY BASED ON THE 
EXISTENCE OF VOLITIONt 
Kevin W. Saunders* 
A voluntary act, or a volition, is an essential requirement for criminal culpability. The 
requirement of volition, however, appears to raise certain philosophical difficulties. Scholars 
suggest that the lack of a volition should not prevent an act from being criminal because acts 
are generally not accompanied by volition. Another problem is that allowing culpability to 
turn on the existence of a volition appears to assume a solution to a core philosophical prob-
lem-the mind-body problem. Professor Saunders addresses these issues in two parts. First 
he argues that volition accompanies normal acts and the lack of volition is a reasonable basis 
for refusal to find culpability. Professor Saunders then demonstrates that criminal law cir-
cumvents the mind-body problem without assuming a solution to that problem. 
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The concept of the voluntary act l lies at the very foundation of 
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1. Some commentators would consider "voluntary act" to be redundant in that an act always 
involves volition. See, e.g., O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 54 (1881) ("An act ... imports 
intention .... A spasm is not an act. The contraction of the muscles must be willed."). Under this 
443 
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the criminal law, since "[t]here cannot be an act sUbjecting a person 
to ... criminal liability without volition."2 This requirement can be 
found in both the Model Penal Code3 (Code), which states that "[a] 
person is not guilty of an offense unless his liability is based on con-
duct which includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act 
of which he is physically capable,"4 and in the statutes of various 
states.5 Thus, the law treats volition or the voluntary act as crucial in 
the decision to impute culpability. Yet, the philosophical problems 
inherent in a view that treats volition in this manner must be ex-
amined before that position can be taken as justified. 
In attempting to find the central role of volition, one might try to 
treat volition and mens rea 6 as identical, but, while overlapping, these 
view, if there is no volition, there may be action, but there is no act. The dispute is semantic-
whether the names to be attached to two types of events are "actions" and "acts" or "acts" and 
"voluntary acts"-and, so long as terminology is used consistently, no problem should arise from 
either choice. Here, "voluntary act" will be taken as nonredundant. Acts will include actions while 
unconscious, during a seizure, etc. Voluntariness, rather than being necessary to an act, will be 
taken as a property of certain acts. 
2. Bazley v. Tortorich, 397 So. 2d 475, 481 (La. 1981). See People v. Grant, 71 Ill. 2d 551,377 
N.E.2d 4, 8 (1978) ("Certain involuntary acts, i. e., those committed during a state of automatism, 
occur as bodily movements which are not controlled by the conscious mind. . .. [A] person, in a 
state of automatism, who lacks the volition to control or prevent his conduct, cannot be criminally 
responsible for such involuntary acts."); Corder v. Commonwealth, 278 S.W.2d 77, 79 (Ky. 1955) 
("[A] person can not be held criminally responsible for acts committed while he is unconscious."); 
People v. Carlo, 46 A.D.2d 764, 361 N.Y.S.2d 168, 170 (1974) (" '[C]riminalliability' requires at the 
very least a 'voluntary act'."); People v. Marzulli, 76 Misc. 2d 971, 351 N.Y.S.2d 775, 776 (1973) 
("[A]n involuntary act is not criminal."); State v. Peterson, 24 N.C. App. 404, 210 S.E.2d 883, 886 
(1975) ("[A] person cannot be held criminally responsible for acts committed while he is completely 
unconscious .... "); Greenfield v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 710, 204 S.E.2d 414,417 (1974) ("Where 
not self-induced, unconsciousness is a complete defense."); State v. Utter, 4 Wash. App. 137, 479 
P.2d 946, 950 (1971) ("An 'act' committed while one is unconscious is in reality no act at all. It is 
merely a physical event or occurrence for which there can be no criminal liability."). 
3. MODEL PENAL CODE (1962). 
4. ld. § 2.01(1). 
5. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 26 (West 1970 & Supp. 1987) ("All persons are capable of 
committing crimes except those belonging to the following classes: ... Persons who committed the 
act charged without being conscious thereof."); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 194.010 (Michie 1986) 
("All persons are liable to punishment except those belonging to the following classes: ... Persons 
who committed the act charged without being conscious thereof."); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.10 (Mc-
Kinney 1975) ("The minimal requirement for criminal liability is the performance by a person of 
conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act which he is physically 
capable of performing."); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 152 (West 1983) ("All persons are capable of 
committing crimes, except those belonging to the following classes: ... Persons who committed the 
act charged without being conscious thereof."); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-3-1 (Supp. 1987) 
("Any person is capable of committing a crime, except those belonging to the following classes: ... 
Persons who committed the act charged without being conscious thereof .... "). 
6. The mens rea or "guilty mind" is the mental state required as an element of a crime. See, 
e.g., W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 3.4, at 212 (2d ed. 1986). 
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concepts are actually distinct. Mens rea seems to require volition. If 
an act (or omission) is not even voluntary, it could not have been done 
(or omitted) with the degree of intent required for mens rea.7 How-
ever, volition does not require mens rea, that is, an act may be volun-
tary and yet mens rea may be lacking. For example, an individual 
may throw a javelin with only the intent to participate in an athletic 
competition. After making sure that no one is in his path, the athlete 
throws the javelin and impales a bystander who runs across the range 
after the javelin has left his hand.8 The athlete has no intent to cause 
the death of the bystander, nor is he even negligent. There is no mens 
rea, yet the throw seems to be a voluntary act.9 Volition, then, is 
logically a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for finding mens 
rea. 
Although there is a logical relationship between volition and 
mens rea, the existence of any relation between volition and actus 
reus 10 is of particular interest. This is not because volition must be 
viewed as part of one but not of the other. Professor Glanville Wil-
liams argues that volition is necessary for both mens rea and actus 
reus,l1 and that it is sufficient for neither.12 The particular importance 
of volition to actus reus springs, instead, from other sources. 
First, any relation between volition and actus reus adds a new 
element to the analysis of actus reus, whereas the relation to mens rea 
does not require further analysis that is different in kind. Since the 
analysis of volition and mens rea both require insight into mental 
states, a conclusion that volition was absent could just as easily be 
7. See Patient, Some Remarks about the Element of Voluntariness in Offenses of Absolute Lia-
bility, 1968 CRIM. L. REv. 23, 26-28. 
8. See Antiphon, The Second Tetralogy, in 1 MINOR ATIlC ORATORS 86, 89 (K. Maidment 
trans. 1940). 
9. See infra notes 51-70 and accompanying text. 
10. The actus reus or "guilty act" is the act that must occur before criminal liability may 
attach. Thinking about burglarizing a home is not a crime until the thinker acts on the thought. In 
some cases an omission rather than an affirmative act may serve as the basis for criminal liability. 
See generally W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 6, §§ 3.2-3.3, at 195-212. 
11. See G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW §§ 8, 17, 157, at 11, 36,482 (2d ed. 1961). Williams is, 
however, critical of some applications of this view. See id. § 9. See also supra notes 7-9 and accom-
panying text for the necessity of volition to mens rea, and infra notes 51-70 and accompanying text 
for a discussion of the necessity of volition to actus reus. 
12. The insufficiency of volition as mens rea is discussed in the text accompanying supra note 9. 
The insufficiency of volition as actus reus should be clear. Simply willing an act, assuming acts are 
willed, is not an adequate basis for even an attempt conviction. See infra notes 48-101 and accompa-
nying text. Volition must be accompanied by at least some motion-criminality requires an act, and 
whatever else it may be, "[an act] is a muscular contraction." O.W. HOLMES, supra note I, at 54. 
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phrased as the more general conclusion that there was no mens rea. 
In contrast, the inclusion of volition as a part of actus reus adds a 
mental element to what would otherwise be purely a question of the 
occurrence of physical events. 
Second, not all crimes require mens rea. It is to these crimes of 
strict liability that the relation between volition and actus reus is par-
ticularly important. If volition is necessary to actus reus, then there is 
a mental element necessary even to strict liability offenses. Without 
volition, there is no act attributable to the individual on which liabil-
ity may be based. 13 
Finally, the relation between volition and actus reus may have an 
effect on the admissibility of evidence in a criminal trial. For exam-
ple, in one case, the defendant in a burglary trial claimed that he en-
tered the dwelling in a state of automatism.14 In response to that 
defense, the prosecution offered evidence of the defendant's prior bur-
glary convictions. On appeal, the conviction was overturned because 
similar prior convictions were admissible only to refute a claim of lack 
of mens rea, and in this case the defendant claimed he lacked actus 
reus. IS 
This importance of volition to actus reus is of academic interest 
only, unless the concept has some effect in the application of the law. 
Despite blanket hornbook claims, such as "it is clear that criminal 
liability requires that the activity in question be voluntary,"16 and the 
Model Penal Code positionl7 that appears to require a voluntary act 
13. Furthermore, the relation of volition to actus reus may have an effect on the use of the 
insanity defense. If the insanity defense negates only mens rea, while a lack of volition negates actus 
reus, then the proper verdict, when volition is lacking, is an unconditional acquittal rather than an 
acquittal by reason of insanity. See J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 449 (2d ed. 
1960); Fox, Physical Disorder, Consciousness, and Criminal Liability, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 645, 652 
(1963). The distinction between insanity and automatism is not always easily drawn. For a discus-
sion of this distinction and its difficulties, see Holland, Automatism and Criminal Responsibility, 25 
CRIM. L.Q. 95 (1982-1983); Lederman, Non-Insane and Insane Automatism: Reducing the Signifi-
cance of a Problematic Distinction, 34 INT'L & COMPo L.Q. 819 (1985). 
14. See Regina v. Harrison-Owen, 2 All E.R. 726 (Crim. App. 1951), cited in G. WILLIAMS, 
supra note 11, § 9. 
15. Harrison-Owen, 2 All E.R. at 727-28. 
16. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTI, supra note 6, § 3.2(c), at 197 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 2.01(1) (1962». See Patient, supra note 7, at 28 ("Lack of voluntariness ... negatives even actus 
reus."). 
17. See supra text accompanying note 4. See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(2) (1962) (cata-
loging nonvoluntary acts as "(a) a reflex or convulsion; (b) a bodily movement during unconscious-
ness or sleep; (c) conduct during hypnosis or resulting from hypnotic suggestion; (d) a bodily 
movement that otherwise is not a product of the effort or determination of the actor, either conscious 
or habitual"). 
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for actus reus,I8 some scholars question the applicability of the doc-
trine. Most notably, Professor H. L. A. Hart has claimed that the 
"doctrine has only rarely been considered by the courts" and that he 
is "not convinced that the courts actually do accept [the] general doc-
trine."19 Some of Hart's skepticism may have been due to his failure 
to "find in any legal writings any clear or credible account of what it 
is for conduct to be voluntary ... in the sense required."20 But, before 
turning to Hart's challenge to provide a credible account for the the-
ory, the first charge-that the courts do not accept the doctrine-
should be addressed briefly. 
Hart is certainly correct in asserting that the courts do not often 
consider the doctrine that a voluntary act is a requirement for crimi-
nal liability. The issue arises in some instances,21 but courts often 
"seem ... to dispose of the cases by quite a different technique,"22 
with the result that few appellate decisions reverse a conviction be-
cause of the lack of volition in the alleged actus reus. But, such cases 
exist,23 and in some cases in which convictions were upheld, they were 
affirmed based either on the existence of sufficient evidence for the 
jury to have found volition behind the defendant's acts,24 the self-
induced nature of the unconsciousness which would otherwise have 
negated actus reus,2S or the failure to raise the issue at trial.26 In each 
18. See Fox, supra note 13, at 652 n.48. 
19. Hart, Acts of Will and Legal Responsibility, in FREEDOM AND THE WILL 38, 41 (D. Pears 
ed. 1963). 
20. Hart, Acts of Will and Responsibility, in THE JUBILEE LECTURES OF THE FACULTY OF 
LAW, UNIVERSITY OF SHEFFIELD 115, 115-16 (0. Marshall ed. 1960). 
21. See supra note 2. 
22. Hart, supra note 19, at 41-42. 
23. See People v. Carlo, 46 A.D.2d 764, 361 N.Y.S.2d 168 (1974) (defendant, who had been 
given a hallucinogen, could not be convicted of assault and weapons possession since his acts were 
not voluntary); People v. Newton, 72 Misc. 2d 646, 340 N.Y.S.2d 77 (1973) (defendant, who had 
been a passenger on a Bahamas-Luxemburg flight diverted to New York, was not guilty of possess-
ing a concealable firearm without a license, despite the fact that intent was not an element of the 
offense). 
24. See Corder v. Commonwealth, 278 S.W.2d 77 (Ky. 1955) (jury instructions on involuntari-
ness not required due to lack of evidence of unconsciousness); State v. Paterson, 24 N.C. App. 404, 
210 S.E.2d 883 (1975) (sufficient evidence for jury to believe defendant was conscious at time of 
shooting). 
25. See Greenfield v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 710, 204 S.E.2d 414 (1974) (conviction affirmed 
despite black-out claim when defendant was a drug user); State v. UUer, 4 Wash. App. 137,479 P.2d 
946 (1971) (no involuntariness defense when unconsciousness voluntarily induced by alcohol or 
drugs). 
26. See People v. Grant, 71 Ill. 2d 551, 377 N.E.2d 4 (1978). 
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of these cases the court at least considered the doctrine and felt com-
pelled to explain why the doctrine did not apply. 
Other possible explanations may account for the lack of appellate 
decisions turning on the concept of voluntary act. First, since the 
prosecution cannot appeal an acquittal,27 any case in which the de-
fendant was successful with an involuntariness defense would not re-
sult in an appellate opinion. Second, it is not clear how often a 
prosecutor believed that there was no volition, and, either guided by a 
statute,28 or in an exercise of prosecutorial discretion,29 chose not to 
bring charges. 
Even if there are very few cases in which a lack of volition plays a 
part in a decision not to press charges or is the basis for a verdict or 
an appellate decision, the concept is important in application. The 
analysis of what is missing in an involuntary act that leads to a finding 
of no criminal liability is inextricably tied to the analysis of what is 
present in the voluntary act that leads to imputation of criminalliabil-
ity. The analysis provides some insight into the application of the law 
to the more common cases. 
This Article is concerned with the analysis of the voluntary act. 
Section II isolates and defines the concepts involved in a thorough 
analysis of the voluntary act. The concept of act is defined, and voli-
tion compared and contrasted to intention. Section III discusses the 
relation between willing or volition and the voluntary act. A reply is 
offered to Hart's argument that bodily motion generally is not willed 
and it is thereby shown that the distinction between voluntary and 
involuntary acts is meaningful. 
Even having refuted Hart, however, a problem still remains. All 
that will be shown is that there is a correlation between volitions and 
voluntary acts. Yet, the establishment of culpability based on the 
existence of a volition appears to assume that the volition is also the 
cause of the act. That assumption ignores the mind-body problem, 
that is, the question of the relationships between mind and body and 
whether mental and physical events may cause one another. The long 
history of that problem as an unresolved philosophical question indi-
27. Such an appeal would violate the defendant's guarantee against double jeopardy. See U.S. 
CONST. amend. V. See also Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962). 
28. See supra note 5. 
29. Prosecutors are allowed broad discretion in determining whether to press charges and are 
allowed to consider such factors as whether "a prosecution will promote the ends of justice, instill 
respect for the law" and comport with "policy [and] the climate of public opinion." Pugach v. 
Klein, 193 F. Supp. 630, 634-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). 
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cates that it should not be swept aside lightly. In Section IV, criminal 
law concepts are employed to show that culpability may be based on 
volition without assuming any mind-body causation, thereby estab-
lishing a more philosophically secure basis for allowing culpability to 
turn on the existence of volition. 
II. DEFINING THE TERMS 
Before turning to an analysis of voluntary acts, the nature of act 
must be clarified. The volition involved in voluntary acts must also be 
distinguished from other mental events or attitudes that may accom-
panyacts. 
A. The Nature of Acts 
General consensus is lacking regarding what constitutes an act. 
This dispute takes place on two levels. One level concerns the distinc-
tion between acts and actions, that is, whether the physical actions of 
a person are to be considered acts if they are not accompanied by 
volition. That question, too, may be viewed in either of two ways. It 
may be seen as a question of semantics-whether interactions of a 
human body with its environment should be split into two groups la-
belled "act" and "action" or whether the two groups should be la-
belled "voluntary act" and "act." That semantic question will not be 
considered here, and this Article will simply call all human actions 
acts and will distinguish between those acts that are voluntary and 
those acts that are not. 3D Alternatively, the question may be whether 
the act-voluntary act distinction is a meaningful one, that is, whether 
there really is a mental element, or any other foundation on which to 
base the distinction. That question is the focus of this Article and 
cannot be answered in this definitional Section without begging the 
question. 
The dispute considered in this subsection is over the scope of the 
physical aspects of human acts. It is a dispute that may be laid out by 
considering the two extremes, as expressed by legal scholars. Justice 
Holmes takes the least complex view of acts:31 "An act is always a 
30. See supra note 1. 
31. This is the least complex view in the sense that other physical circumstances and conse-
quences are not considered. In search of even less complexity one might argue that only a person's 
mental acts should be considered. While such a view might be interesting to a philosopher of mind, 
it would be of little interest to criminal law, where a physical act is required before mental states 
become pertinent. 
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voluntary muscular contraction, and nothing else. The chain of phys-
ical sequences which it sets in motion or directs to the plaintiff's harm 
is no part of it, and very generally a long train of such sequences 
intervenes."32 Holmes' view is not original; rather, it echoes Professor 
Austin, who states: 
Most of the names which seem to be names of acts, are names of acts 
coupled with certain of their consequences. For example: If I kill you 
with a gun or pistol, I shoot you. And the long train of incidents which 
are denoted by that brief expression, are considered (or spoken of) as if 
they constituted an act, perpetrated by me. In truth, the only parts of the 
train which are my act or acts, are the muscular motions by which I raise 
the weapon, point it ... and pull the trigger.33 
Contrasted to the Austin-Holmes view is that of Sir John William 
Salmond: 
[For] some writers ... the circumstances and consequences of an act are 
not part of it, but are wholly external to it. This limitation, however, 
seems no less inadmissible in law than contrary to the common usage of 
speech. We habitually include all material and relevant circumstances 
and consequences under the name of the act . .. not merely the muscular 
contractions by which the result is effected.34 
Salmond's description of act thus includes: (1) a movement (or per-
haps an omission); (2) certain circumstances existing at the time of 
the movement; and (3) certain consequences of the movement. 
The advocates of Salmond's view rest their position on two argu-
ments. The first argument is that "[e]ven in common speech an act 
involves more than Holmes's muscular contraction: it includes cer-
tain circumstances and consequences. "35 The point is not without 
weight, but neither is it compelling. People commonly speak of mov-
ing a book or opening a door as acts. In these cases they are less 
likely to speak in terms of the contraction of certain muscles or com-
binations of muscles in a particular sequence. Rather, they refer to 
the consequence or the circumstance as the act. In other cases, how-
ever, people speak of acts in terms of the contraction of muscles. This 
speech is most likely to occur when coaching an athlete or describing 
aimless motion, that is, when the particular contraction requires con-
32. D.W. HOLMES, supra note 1, at 91. 
33. 1 J. AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 290 (R. Campbell ed. 1874) (emphasis 
added). 
34. J. SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 370 (10th ed. 1947) (emphasis added). 
35. G. WILLIAMS, supra note 11, § 11, at 18. See supra text accompanying note 33. 
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centration or when it is difficult to select an identifiable consequence 
or goal in terms of which to describe the motion. 
The "common usage" argument need not force the conclusion 
that an act includes circumstances and consequences. To conclude 
that it does is to focus on one particular usage of a word that in popu-
lar speech has several uses.36 Sometimes acts are described in terms of 
circumstances and consequences simply as a form of shorthand. 
When an act is described as "placing a book on the desk," more infor-
mation is conveyed more quickly than would be the case in describing 
muscular contractions or bodily motions. When exact knowledge of 
the sequence of motions is not required, for example, when there is 
nothing peculiar as to how the book was placed on the desk, the 
shorthand is justified. However, the conclusion that an act must in-
clude more than bodily movements is not justified, and is not logically 
sound. 
Once circumstances and consequences are required to be in-
cluded in an act, logical bounds to the act disappear. The bodily mo-
tions most concisely described as changing a spark plug may also be 
described as making a living. The only reason to conclude that 
changing a spark plug is the best description of the act is that it is 
better shorthand. It appeals to common experiences which lead the 
hearer to understand what movements took place with minimal refer-
ence to intention or motive. Any use of shorthand beyond that neces-
sary to describe concisely the movements involved is an emphasis on 
the intent or motive behind an act rather than a description of the act. 
Such an emphasis may at times be important, but that does not mean 
that an act must include the surrounding circumstances and reSUlting 
consequences. 
The second argument in support of Salmond's view is based on 
legal definition and theory. In Salmond's words: 
The act of the murderer is the shooting or poisoning of his victim, not 
merely the muscular contractions by which the result is effected. To tres-
pass on another man's land is a wrongful act; but the act includes the 
circumstances that the land belongs to another man, no less than the 
bodily movements by which the trespasser enters upon it.37 
Salmond would be correct if he were proposing only that the cir-
cumstances and consequences are legally relevant. There are cer-
36. See Cook, Act, Intention, and Motive in the Criminal Law, 26 YALE L.J. 645, 649-50 
(1917). 
37. J. SALMOND, supra note 34, at 370. 
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tainly legal differences between performing those bodily movements 
most easily described as firing a rifle when no one else is present, and 
firing a rifle when another person is present and hit by the bullet. 
While the bodily movements are the same, the circumstances and 
consequences lead to different legal conclusions. However, intent and 
perhaps a view as to how a reasonable person would have behaved 
also affect the legal conclusion. These latter factors, while legally rel-
evant, are not viewed as part of the act itself. Accordingly, the legal 
relevance of the physical circumstances and consequences does not 
seem to require that they be viewed as part of the act. 
Williams, while supporting Salmond's view, provides the key for 
responding to the second argument: "The muscular contraction, re-
garded as an actus reus, cannot be separated from its circum-
stances."38 He correctly asserts that actus reus includes 
circumstances and consequences, but that does not mean that an act 
must also be so inclusive. Even those who argue that acts are simply 
bodily movements would have to admit that acts are accompanied by 
circumstances and consequences.39 Concluding that acts are bodily 
movements simpliciter can be consistent with agreeing that the law 
requires actus reus which includes relevant circumstances and 
consequences. 
Since the arguments for the Salmond view do not succeed in re-
quiring the inclusion of consequences and circumstances in an act, the 
question of their inclusion is semantic. Austin may define actions as 
bodily movements and muscle contractions without regard to circum-
stances and consequences. An adherent to Salmond's view, now 
forced to recognize the separability of bodily motion from circum-
stances and consequences, may yet choose to retain the term "act" as 
applicable only to the whole complex. But, he must recognize a sepa-
rable bodily-motion portion of the act. The choice of terms is less 
important than the recognition of separability. One must now simply 
choose, and make clear, how "act" is to be used. This Article adopts 
a version of the Austin-Holmes approach and defines an act as a mus-
cular contraction or perhaps a series of muscular contractions.40 
38. G. WILLIAMS, supra note 11, § 11, at 19 (emphasis added). 
39. See 1 J. AUSTIN, supra note 33, at 293 ("But every act is followed by consequences; and is 
also attended by concomitants, which are styled its circumstances."); O.W. HOLMES, supra note I, at 
54 ("All acts, taken apart from their surrounding circumstances, are indifferent to the law."). 
40. For a discussion of complex sequences of movements as basic acts, see infra notes 62-67 
and accompanying text. 
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When relevant, discussion of the accompanying circumstances and re-
sulting consequences is added. 
B. Volition and Intention 
The definition of act leads to a particular view of the distinction 
between volition and intention. Since this Article has adopted a defi-
nition of act similar to Austin's, his theories on the distinction be-
tween volition and intention provide guidance in this portion of the 
analysis. According to Austin: 
To desire the act is to will it. To expect any of its consequences, is to 
intend those consequences. 
The act itself is intended as well as willed. For every volition is 
accompanied by an expectation or belief, that the bodily movement 
wished will immediately follow the wish. 
Now the consequence of an act is never willed. For none but acts 
themselves are the appropriate objects of volitions. Nor is it always in-
tended. For the party who wills the act, may not expect the consequence. 
If a consequence of the act be desired, it is probably intended. But ... an 
intended consequence is not always desired. Intentions, therefore, regard 
acts; or they regard the consequences of acts.41 
Since acts and consequences are separable, they may be accom-
panied by different mental acts or states. As Austin indicates, conse-
quences may be intended42 or unintended. But, acts may also be 
either intended or, in the case of a convulsion or reflex, unintended. 
According to Austin, the difference in the applicable mental element 
between physical acts and their consequences is that acts may be 
willed, whereas consequences are never willed. 
It is not clear that Austin is correct. Arguably, one can will the 
death of another. However, absent some extraordinary psychic 
power, the consequence will not result from the willing of the act. 
Austin's view, however, is not defeated by the suggested argument. 
While desiring an act is willing it, and desiring a consequence may be 
intending it, there is a difference in the closeness of the connections 
between the desire that is will and the act willed and the desire that is 
intention and the consequence intended. The only desires immedi-
41. 1 J. AUSTIN, supra note 33, at 293-94. 
42. See id. However, Austin's use of the term intended seems broader in scope than the com-
mon usage. Under his view, recklessness would be included as intention since, in such cases, the 
consequence is expected (all that is necessary in Austin's scheme), although it may not be desired. 
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ately followed by their appropriate or direct objects are volitions.43 
Bodily movements-acts-may directly follow the desire for those 
acts. Consequences, absent psychic power, do not immediately follow 
desire. They require an act and some physical chain of cause and 
effect. 
Intentions are positive mental attitudes regarding foreseen conse-
quences of acts.44 Willing or volition seems to enjoy a closer, and 
perhaps even causal connection, to the act itself. Volition may be de-
fined as "a mental state or process which expresses a propositional 
attitude and which tends to initiate behavioural episodes correspond-
ing to the content of that propositional attitude"45 or as "a conscious 
or mental act which initiates and guides the physical change that is 
brought about deliberately in a physical act."46 The nature of that 
connection or relation between volition and act is the subject of the 
remainder of this Article. 
III. VOLITIONS AND VOLUNTARY ACTS: CORRELATION 
AND CAUSATION 
The ascription of criminal liability based on the existence of a 
voluntary act would be on its firmest footing if a causal relation could 
be shown between volition and act.47 However, before turning to an 
examination of that possibility, it is necessary first to examine a looser 
connection. The philosopher David Hume argues that causality is 
nothing more than constant conjunction.48 While that conclusion is 
43. ld. at 295-96. Of course, volitions are not always successful in bringing about the appropri-
ate or direct objects. A paralytic may form volitions without the object muscle contractions coming 
to pass. Nonetheless, volitions are the only desires that may be immediately followed by their appro-
priate or direct objects. The desires that are intention cannot be followed so directly by their objects. 
44. In criminal law, intention may include knowledge rather than desire (positive mental atti-
tude). See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 6, § 3.5(a), at 217. 
45. Gorr, Willing, Trying and Doing, 57 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 237, 237 (1979). Gorr also 
argues that volition and intention are not really dissimilar, id. at 248, but he seems more concerned 
with the explanatory use of the concepts. They are similar in that both concepts are useful in ex-
plaining what one may be said to do, but they differ in how closely connected they are to the act of 
doing. Gorr does not recognize this because he distinguishes willing from trying. See id. at 245-46. 
By so doing he turns willing into something like an intention to try, that is, he separates willing from 
the act to the point where it is no longer the volition. 
46. Ripley, A Theory of Volition, 11 AM. PHIL. Q. 141, 143 (1974) (emphasis omitted). 
47. If volitions cause acts, the mind is the causal agent. If volitions do not cause acts, the mind 
might be seen as approving the act but not involved and so, perhaps, not culpable. See infra text 
accompanying note 104. 
48. See generally D. HUME, AN INQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING §§ 4-7 (C. 
Hendel ed. 1955). 
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open to debate, constant conjunction is at least a necessary aspect of 
causation.49 But, Hart's view calls into question even this weaker 
connection between volition and voluntary acts. so Therefore, before 
turning to the question of strong causation, Hart's challenge must be 
met. 
A. Correlation 
Hart characterizes Austin's position on voluntary acts as follows: 
"Conduct is 'voluntary' or 'the expression of an act of will' if the mus-
cular contraction which, on the physical side, is the initiating element 
of what are loosely thought of as simple actions, is caused by a desire 
for those same contractions."51 Hart attacks Austin's position, argu-
ing that it runs counter to ordinary experience. Hart does not argue 
absence of any defect in instances of involuntary acts but that 
we cannot convey the difference between the normal case and these very 
abnormal ones, by saying that in the normal case there is a desire for the 
muscular contractions which is absent in the abnormal case. For the de-
sire for muscular contraction as a component of ordinary action is a 
fiction. 52 
Hart finds the desire to contract muscles to be very rare and that acts 
are normally performed without any such desire. 53 He admits of in-
stances in which it may be said that what a person did was contract 
his muscles, for example, in the furtherance of physical training or in 
the exertion of extraordinary force. But, in normal action, even an 
awareness of which muscles are contracted results only from perform-
ing an action and reflecting on what has occurred. 54 In his view, nor-
mal actions are not subsumed under Austin's category of voluntary 
acts. 
Hart offers an alternative theory. He suggests that those cases in 
which one would concede that an act lacks an element of will are 
"cases where muscular movements occur which form no part of any 
49. It would be inconsistent to state that A is the cause of B, if A occurs, yet B does not, or if B 
occurs without A. Hence, A and B must be constantly conjoined before a claim of causation is 
reasonable. 
50. See Hart, supra note 19; see generally Hart, supra note 20. 
51. Hart, supra note 20, at 126. 
52. Id. at 129. 
53. Id. at 130-31. Hart is willing to accept a theory that normal action involves a desire to do 
something involving muscular contraction, but this theory would be unacceptable to Austin. See id. 
at 132. 
54. See Hart, supra note 19, at 44-45. 
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action which the agent believes himself to be doing,"55 or are "not 
appropriate"56 to such action. But arguably, Hart's criterion selects 
not only involuntary acts, but also some negligent acts. 57 An act done 
without thinking may not be appropriate to an action in which the 
actor believes himself to be engaged, yet such thoughtless acts may be 
the basis for a finding of negligence, since they are not involuntary in 
the sense in which an actus reus may be found lacking. In Hart's 
approach, volition or will is noncausal, which is consistent with his 
view that, even in normal cases, volition is lacking. If he is correct in 
the latter view, his appropriateness approach might have some value 
as a fallback position despite the noted shortcoming. However, Hart's 
argument against even the constant conjunction variety of causation 
may be rebutted, thereby saving a role for volition and voluntary act 
in criminal law. 
The only adequate response to Hart is to argue that volition does 
generally accompany acts. This occurs so regularly that the cases in 
which volition is lacking are described as cases in which no voluntary 
act exists, even though movement is present. 
The philospher Hugh McCann adopts this approach, arguing the 
existence of "sound evidence that acts of volition occur typically when 
bodily movements are performed. "58 McCann finds evidence for his 
conclusion in an analysis of the attempts of paralytics to contract 
their muscles. He argues that paralytics try to move, and in fact this 
is the only way that such a person learns he is paralyzed. Further-
more, he argues that the trying of a paralytic is not significantly differ-
ent from the trying of nonparalytics. 
According to McCann, the only difference in the trying of 
paralytics and nonparalytics is success. When the trying is unsuccess-
ful, we are left with only the trying to discuss. But when the trying is 
successful, we are left with an action into which the trying is sub-
sumed. McCann states: 
With attempts at overt actions ... it is generally the case that when 
a person tries to A and succeeds, his trying to A is not an entirely distinct 
action fromA. Rather, it belongs toA, as part of the process which is the 
performance of A. To put it another way, when the agent succeeds, the 
55. Id. at 46. For a similar approach, see A. MELDEN, FREE ACTION (1961). 
56. Hart, supra note 20, at 134. 
57. See Murphy, Involuntary Acts and Criminal Liability, 81 ETHICS 332, 337 (1971). 
58. McCann, Trying, Paralysis, and Volition, 28 REV. METAPHYSICS 423, 424 (1975). Mc-
Cann cites and seems influenced by E. HODGINS, EPISODE: REPORT ON THE ACCIDENT INSIDE My 
SKULL (1964), an autobiographical account of the experiences of a stroke victim. 
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exercise of agency that is necessary for A to be an action at all is in the 
trying.59 
Further, 
"trying" never names a unique species of action, but rather functions 
always as a general name for the business of going about the iIltentional 
performance of action. . .. We speak of trying only when we have occa-
sion to distinguish this business from the actual, complete performance of 
an act, either intentionally or unintentionally. But it is present wherever 
action is undertaken: we try to do what, in acting, we are undertaking to 
do.60 
457 
While McCann discusses trying, his conclusions apply to volition.61 
After all, the mental activity of trying can be found only in volition. 
Charles Ripley, another philosopher, offers an alternative 
counter to Hart's attack. 62 He argues that, while all actions must be 
reducible to basic actions,63 those basic actions may be skilled actions, 
that is, "the class of basic actions is larger than that of mere bodily 
movements."64 His position is that "as skills are acquired, actions 
that are non-basic at the beginning of the learning process become 
basic ... [and] the acquisition of [the] skill is often accompanied by a 
forgetting of the details of how the skilled action is performed. "65 
59. McCann, supra note 58, at 434 (emphasis in original). See also O'Connor, The Voluntary 
Act, 15 MED. SCI. & L. 31 (1975). O'Connor states: 
Ordinary bodily movement is, in one sense, automatic. This means that one has no 
awareness of the series of events that precede it. It does not mean that the bodily move-
ment is not caused by a series of precedent events and processes, merely that one has no 
reason to examine the causes of such movements. It is not until there is a breakdown or 
malfunction that one looks to find causes for abnormal behaviour just as one begins to 
concern oneself with the working of motor cars only when something goes wrong. 
Id. at 32. 
60. McCann, supra note 58, at 436 (emphasis in original). 
61. Volition is intentional: it counts as the basic move on the agent's part to execute what 
he plans to do. It thereby constitutes in itself an instance of what is called trying. And 
where success in overt action is achieved, volition is the fundamental causal means that 
leads to it. 
Id. at 437 (emphasis in original). 
62. See Ripley, supra note 46. 
63. A basic action is "[a] thing that we simply do without having to do anything else to make it 
happen." A. FLEW, A DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 36 (1979) (emphasis in original). A muscle 
contraction is then a basic action. Flew also includes, as an example, raising one's arm. See id. But, 
defining basic action to include such a complex of muscular contractions assumes the conclusion 
argued for in the text. 
64. Ripley, supra note 46, at 141. 
65. Id. at 142. Ripley is influenced by Annette Baier's account of the "gestalt lace-tier" who 
can tie his shoe laces but cannot describe the motions involved except by actually tying the laces. 
See Baier, The Search for Basic Actions, 8 AM. PHIL. Q. 161, 166 (1971). 
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Ripley is not referring merely to intentions or to the physical 
descriptions of acts. Rather, "the object of volition changes as the 
skill of the agent increases."66 If the object of volition changes, the 
volition itself must also change, since a desire for A and a desire for B 
differ, even when A is a part of B. Ripley's position is that basic ac-
tion is always accompanied by volition, but basic actions and volitions 
become more complex with increasing skill. If, as Hart suggests, one 
does not normally refer to volition or willing in contracting one's 
muscles, it is only because those contractions are part of a basic action 
and the volition is aimed at the complex of contractions involved. 
Ripley's position seems superior to Hart's. There is a certain ar-
tificiality to Hart's assumption that the contraction of a single muscle 
must be the basic action at which volition is directed. Complex move-
ment may sometimes be accomplished one contraction at a time, but 
skill is acquired through patterning. The wrestler concentrates on one 
movement and then on another, repeating them in more and more 
rapid succession, until the whole sequence flows from the decision to 
use the particular combination comprising the "move." Similarly, 
and more simply, raising one's arm may require contracting the bi-
ceps, the deltoid and the triceps. The combination of contractions 
results in the intended movement, and the combination is the object of 
volition. The individual does not concentrate on each muscle sepa-
rately;67 rather, once the motion is patterned in early childhood, he 
concentrates on, or wills, the combination of contractions of which 
raising the arm consists. The volition that once would have been di-
rected at the single contraction is so subsumed under the volition di-
rected toward the complex series as to no longer be present. Yet there 
is still volition in each case of normal action. 
The best response to Hart lies in a synthesis of McCann's and 
Ripley's positions. If, as McCann argues, one only speaks of trying 
when one is unsuccessful in the doing, then as skill is acquired, talk of 
trying decreases with regard to the individual contractions that make 
up the skilled action. Since there may still be some difficulty with the 
skilled action, there may still be an emphasis on trying with regard to 
the combination, but it, too, will decrease as success becomes more 
regular. Hart has not shown that there is a lack of volition in normal 
66. Ripley, supra note 46, at 145 (emphasis omitted). 
67. W. F. R. Hardie argues that Austin's theory does not commit him to holding that there 
must be an awareness of the individual muscular contractions involved in each of a person's acts. 
See Hardie, Willing and Acting, 21 PHIL. Q. 193,200-04 (1971). 
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acts but rather that there is a lack of talk of volition.68 Because Hart 
is looking in the wrong place for such talk, and even when looking in 
the right place, talk may be absent while volition is present, Hart's 
position loses its appeal. 
Accordingly, Hart's attack on Austin fails.69 The lack ofempha-
sis on volition in ordinary cases of bodily movement does not mean 
that volition is not present in all normal acts. Indeed, volition accom-
panies normal acts. And, as even Hart admits, volition is lacking in 
the abnormal cases. Consequently, there is constant conjunction or 
correlation.70 However, correlation is not causation. 
68. Cf Gustafson, Voluntary and Involuntary, 24 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL REs. 493, 
498 (1964). Gustafson holds the position that acts are voluntary only when inculpation or exculpa-
tion is in order. This position also seems based more on when one talks of volition and may help 
explain Hart's position that volition is not present in normal acts. Rather, since for most acts incul-
pation or exculpation is not at issue, there is simply no reason to speak of volition. See Melden, 
Action, in EssAYS IN PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY 58, 74 (D. Gustafson ed. 1964). Melden argues 
that it is a context of moral rules and principles that leads us to treat bodily movements as acts. His 
position may also be taken as a conclusion regarding when one talks of volition. One does so only 
when there is a moral factor involved, and since most simple movements are of little or no moral 
concern, there is no talk of volition in "normal" cases. 
69. Hart offers another criticism of Austin's account. He argues that the account does not 
address omissions, that is, there is no criterion for saying that an omission is involuntary. See Hart, 
supra note 19, at 45; see generally Hart, supra note 20. But, as R. F. StaIley points out, "Austin ... 
does not suggest that his account of action should be applied in this way. . .. Its purpose is simply 
to provide a distinction between positive acts and mere bodily movements." StaIley, Austin's Ac-
count of Action, 18 J. HIST. PHIL. 448, 449 (1980). Indeed, Austin indicates that the analysis of 
omissions must be of a different nature. He states, "It follows from the nature of Volitions, that 
forbearance from acts are not willed, but intended." 1 J. AUSTIN, supra note 33, at 296. 
The analysis of omissions is beyond the scope of this Article, which is instead directed at volun-
tary acts. Hart's other criticism will not be addressed in any detail. However, the most promising 
approach to such a discussion would be through a consideration of the possibility of having taken 
voluntary action. That is, an omission is culpable if the individual could have acted had he chosen to 
do so. See generally G. MOORE, ETHICS (1963); Gustafson, supra note 68, at 498-501; Sweeney, 
G.E. Moore and Voluntary Actions, 51 NEW SCHOLASTICISM 196 (1977). 
70. Two types of acts seem troublesome to this claim. In the first, the actor's motions are, in 
some sense, the product of coercion. He is threatened with death or some lesser harm unless he acts 
as directed. In the second, the body of an individual that is so absorbed in thought or preoccupied 
with concentration on some task as to have no awareness of his bodily motions moves in such a way 
that, absent that absorbed or preoccupied state, criminal liability would attach. Are these acts vol-
untary, and is there volition on the part of the actor? 
The presence of volition in the case of the coerced action does not present much difficulty. The 
actor does not lack the control missing in the cases of convulsion or movements while unconscious. 
There is volition; the actor has willed the contractions of the muscles involved. But, for the pro-
posed correlation to hold, the act must also be voluntary. 
The coercion may seem to make the act involuntary, but the act itself, the contraction or com-
plex of contractions, is best viewed as voluntary. Coerced and noncoerced acts do not differ because 
of the presence or lack of desire for the movements; rather, they differ because of reason(s) why those 
movements are desired. This is not even a difference in intent; it is a problem of motive. The analy-
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Further analysis is needed to determine whether the close rela-
tionship between volition and voluntary acts is causal in more than 
sis of the coerced actor's motives may be fraught with difficulty, but the act is voluntary under any of 
the definitions presented. See generally Thalberg, Hierarchical Analysis of Unfree Action, 8 CAN. J. 
PHIL. 211 (1978). 
The act is voluntary under Austin's analysis because it is volitional, but that provides no insight, 
and using that fact to demonstrate correlation would involve circular reasoning. More interestingly, 
the act is voluntary under Hart's approach. The act is related to, or appropriate to, an activity in 
which the actor believes himself to be engaged. See supra text accompanying notes 53-56. The only 
difficulty is that the actor, in some sense, does not want to be involved in the activity in question. 
But this is not a factor for Hart in determining whether the act is voluntary. The act is also volun-
tary under a Moore-like approach that concentrates on whether the actor could have chosen to do 
other than what he did. See G. MOORE, supra note 69; Gustafson, supra note 68, at 498-501; Swee-
ney, supra note 69. 
The coerced actor may not be considered culpable, see generally W. LAFAVE & A. SCOlT, 
supra note 6, § 5.3, at 432-41, not because his acts are not voluntary; rather because they are justified 
or excused. The Model Penal Code's treatment of these areas supports this view. The Code treats 
coercion ill the duress section, § 2.09, while involuntary acts are excluded from criminal liability in 
§ 2.01. If the Code considered acts under duress to be involuntary, § 2.01 would make § 2.09 redun-
dant (except as to the level of duress required). Rather, the listing in § 2.01 of the sorts of acts that 
are involuntary indicates that acts under duress are voluntary, and § 2.09 is needed to handle such 
cases. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.01, 2.09 (1962). 
The case of the subconscious act is more difficult. One whose body moves, while the mind is 
totally engrossed in thought, appears to be lacking volition. The mind, so occupied, does not con-
sciously will the movement, and this lack of volition is not the sort that may be addressed by finding 
volition in a more skilled basic action. It is not that the movement has been incorporated in a 
complex of movements and that the complex is willed. Rather, there appears to be no volition that 
would encompass the movement in question. Yet, the individual is not unconscious in the sense in 
which a sleep-walker is, nor lacking control in the sense in which one in the midst of a seizure is. 
The problem seems to be the result of forcing a continuum of, or at least a natural tripartite 
division of, states of consciousness into a dichotomy of voluntary-involuntary, willed-unwilled or 
conscious-unconscious. Analysis of the in-between state or states of consciousness is sparse. One 
finds statements such as "one is not guilty of murder if he killed the victim while asleep or in the 
clouded state between sleeping and waking." W. LAFAVE & A. SCOlT, supra note 6, § 3.2(c), at 
198. While this in-between state may be recognized, commentators generally place this sta,te of 
consciousness in one of the two more defined categories. However, when the question to be an-
swered-the existence or nonexistence of actus reus-is black or white, there is no room for shades 
of gray. The in-between cases must be placed in one of the two categories. 
The best approach seems to be a case-by-case analysis of whether the defendant's state of mind 
was more like the conscious state or more like the unconscious. Suggesting criteria for that decision 
is beyond the scope of this Article, but an interesting analysis of the relationship between uncon-
scious mental states and criminal liability is provided in Moore, Responsibility and the Unconscious, 
53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1563 (1980). What is of importance here is that these subconscious acts do not 
require the abandonment of the claim of correlation between volition and voluntary act. When the 
jury finds volition, the act is considered voluntary; when the jury finds no volition, the act is consid-
ered involuntary. 
While the suggested approach makes no contribution to this analysis of voluntary acts, neither 
is it question begging. The problem presented by the coerced act-the seeming combination of voli-
tion with an involuntary act-is not present here. There is no indication that acts in a "clouded 
state" might be volitional and involuntary or nonvolitional and voluntary. The correlation is still 
present and the problem is simply into which category the act should be placed. 
HeinOnline -- 49 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 461 1987-1988
1988] VOLUNTARY ACTS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 461 
the Humean sense.71 If such a relationship could be established, rest-
ing culpability on the existence of a volition would be on firm ground. 
If the mind, through its volitions, causes the body to act, the mind is 
culpable for those acts. If the mind is not so directly involved, al-
lowing the mind to play such an active role in the attribution of actus 
reus is on less firm ground. 
B. Causation 
The search for a causal connection between volition and act has 
long been one of the central aspects of the mind-body problem.72 A 
volition is a mental event, while the acts considered here are physical 
events. For a purely mental event to cause a physical event would 
violate the principle of the conservation of energy.73 This has led 
some philosophers to adopt a monistic theory of mind and body with 
modern approaches arguing that there are only physical phenomena. 
That is, mental events are identical to a subset of physical events and 
the expressions that seem to distinguish the two distinguish only sig-
nificance or connotation, while the references or denotations of the 
two types of expressions are identical. 74 
A theory that places mental events within the realm of the physi-
cal has the potential to provide a causal relation between volition and 
act. But, some philosophers believe that an acceptable theory must be 
more than philosophical. References to consciousness in the causal 
71. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
72. See, e.g., R. DESCARTES, MEDITATIONS (1641). 
73. The theory of the conservation of energy, to state it simplistically, proposes that energy is 
not created (or lost) but is merely transformed from other forms of energy or matter. Assume that a 
purely mental event does not contain any physical matter or energy. For such a purely mental event 
to cause a physical event, which would involve energy on the physical plane, would be to create that 
physical energy in violation of the principle. 
Dualistic theories that recognize a distinction between mind and body avoid this problem. The 
theory of parallelism argues that there is no causal connection between the mental and physical 
spheres but rather that the mental and physical are simply correlated. See, e.g., Shaffer, Mind-Body 
Problem, in 5 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 336,342 (p. Edwards ed. 1967). Such a theory 
would include the constant conjunction between volitions and voluntary acts, but it rests on an 
incredible string of coincidences. 
An alternative theory, occasionalism, maintains the dualist distinction between mind and body 
and solves the causation problem by having God step in to cause the physical event on the occur-
rence of the mental event and vice versa. See, e.g., N. MALEBRANCHE, DIALOGUES ON METAPHYS-
ICS (W. Doney ed. 1980). 
74. See, e.g., Feigl, The Mind-Body Problem in the Development of Logical Empiricism, in 
READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCiENCE 612 (H. Feigl & M. Brodbeck eds. 1953); Smart, Sensa-
tions and Brain Processes, 68 PHIL. REV. 141 (1959). For a more radical theory that even the signifi-
cance or connotation is identical, see R. CARNAP, THE UNITY OF SCIENCE (1934). 
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process, it is argued, "will be useful only if supplemented by a scien-
tific theory which locates the role of consciousness in the mecha-
nism"75 and "a detailed delineation of the causal process that is 
characteristic of intentional actions is a problem mainly for the special 
science."76 
That position may overstate the case for the problem under con-
sideration. While a physicalist philosopher of mind might not be sat-
isfied with a nonscientific theory, such a theory may be adequate in 
this context. The subject in this Article is the justification for assert-
ing criminality only when an act is accompanied by volition. The 
problem is philosophical, that is, one of ethics or some related field, 
and a philosophical solution may be acceptable. The physicalist phi-
losopher of mind is, in a sense, making a scientific claim that the mind 
has physical existence, and a scientific basis for that claim would be of 
great value. The concern here is one of moral justification. The con-
clusion that criminal sanctions are or are not justified is philosophical, 
and thus the analysis supporting that conclusion may be 
philosophical. 
While a philosophical theory may be acceptable, no definitive 
philosophical solution exists, and like most philosophical problems, 
the issue may defy philosophical resolution. The allusions to a scien-
tific theory, however, point out that, if a theory could be developed, it 
would be useful in providing a solution to the problem. Scientific evi-
dence that provides a physical existence for consciousness or a causal 
connection between volitions and acts would make at least that aspect 
of the assertion of criminality less subject to debate. 
Brain scientists generally have been reluctant to discuss such 
philosophical areas, but the place of consciousness in science has re-
cently found a champion in Dr. Roger Sperry.?7 In Sperry's view, 
brain science not only can, but must, include a place for conscious-
ness. "Any model or description that leaves out conscious forces ... 
is bound to be sadly incomplete and unsatisfactory."78 
According to Sperry, consciousness and conscious phenomena 
are "built of neural and perhaps glial and other physiochemical 
75. Murphy, supra note 57, at 339. 
76. A. GOLDMAN, A THEORY OF HUMAN ACTION 62 (1970). But see Gorr, Agency and Cau-
sation, 9 J. THEORY SOC. BEHAV. 1,5 (1979) (arguing that a common sense, rather than a scientific, 
approach is required). 
77. See, e.g., R. SPERRY, SCIENCE AND MORAL PRIORITY (1983); Sperry, A Modified Concept 
a/Consciousness, 76 PSYCHOLOGICAL REV. 532 (1969). 
78. R. SPERRY, supra note 77, at 31. 
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events,"79 so they are clearly physical. They are found in the overall 
structure of the brain. 
[T]he flow and the timing of impulse traffic through any brain cell, or 
even a nucleus of cells in the brain, are governed largely by the overall 
encompassing properties of the whole cerebral circuit system, within 
which the given cells and fibers are incorporated, and also by the re1a-
tionship of this circuit system to other circuit systems. . .. [I]f one keeps 
climbing upward in the chain of command within the brain, one finds at 
the very top those overall organizational forces and dynamic properties 
of the large patterns of cerebral excitation that are correlated with mental 
states or psychic activity. so 
Sperry theorizes there are many forces present in the brain, ranging 
from the simple to the complex, and the most complex are the forces 
of consciousness: 
When trying to visualize mental properties ... it is important to keep in 
mind the fact that all of the simpler, more primitive, electric, atomic, 
molecular, cellular, and physiological forces remain present ... , but these 
lower level forces and properties have been superseded, encompassed, as 
it were, by those forces of successively higher organizational entities.s1 
Before turning to Sperry's explanation of how consciousness re-
lates to other brain processes, and how volitions could cause volun-
tary acts, the compellingness of his theory of consciousness will be 
explored. First, it is important to note that Sperry admits that he is 
taking "a stand that . . . goes well beyond the facts"S2 and for which 
"[nlo direct empirical proof is available."s3 He also notes, however, 
that the opposing position, the behaviorist-materialist denial of a role 
for consciousness, has no proof either. "It comes down to a balance 
in credibility, all things considered, and ... many of us have come 
increasingly ... to regard this modified ... concept of conscious mind 
as being more credible on several counts than the behaviorist view."s4 
The lack of available proof might cause one to question whether 
Sperry's view can be regarded as a scientific position, but lack of di-
rect proof does not in itself prevent a theory from being scientific. 
79. Id. at 65. Glial cells are the "non-neuronal cellular elements of the central and peripheral 
nervous system." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 493 (4th unabridged Lawyers' ed. 1976) (de-
fining neuroglia). 
80. R. SPERRY, supra note 77, at 33. 
81. Id. at 35-36. 
82. Id. at 31. 
83. Id. at 66. See Sperry, supra note 77, at 532 ("the evidence at hand stilI falls far short of 
providing any full or final answer"). 
84. R. SPERRY, supra note 77, at 66. 
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The explanatory entities behind a scientific theory are not directly ob-
served, but their existence is accepted as the most credible explanation 
for those phenomena that are observed.85 Seemingly then, Sperry's 
theory is as credible as any other scientific paradigm, perhaps en-
joying less support than the more generally accepted ones. There is, 
however, a more serious problem. 
Despite the protests of some philosophers,86 the mind-body prob-
lem may be philosophical and not subject to scientific analysis. The 
situation differs from that of the ordinary explanatory entity. While 
there is no direct impression of those entities, for example, subatomic 
particles, there is evidence of their effects, for example, cloud chamber 
tracks. In contrast, in the mind-body problem, the most direct aware-
ness is of one's own consciousness. How can consciousness then serve 
as an explanatory entity for less directly accessible phenomena? 
When considering the consciousness of others, as Sperry does, 
the parallel to other explanatory entities seems reasonable. But the 
examination yields electric, atomic, molecular, cellular and physiolog-
ical forces, cells, and organizational and dynamic properties.87 This 
outsider's view seems to enjoy little correspondence to the insider's 
view of one's own consciousness. The centuries long history of the 
mind-body problem88 indicates just how strained any asserted corre-
spondence must be. The continued viability of the opposing schools 
of thought demonstrates that the competing positions may not be sub-
ject to the falsifiability that is an essential characteristic of a scientific 
theory. 89 
Even if it should be concluded that Sperry's theory is not scien-
tific, his views should not be dismissed. They are consistent with cer-
tain philosophical physicalist theories of mind90 and transcend those 
theories only in suggesting the particular locus for consciousness. It 
would be worthwhile, for the moment, to accept those views and ex-
amine his theory of the causal power of consciousness. 
According to Sperry, "conscious phenomena ... interact on the 
brain process exerting an active causal influence,"91 a causal influence 
that is possible in a physical theory of mind. 
85. See, e.g., T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 16-18 (2d ed. 1970). 
86. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text. 
87. See supra text accompanying notes 80-81. 
88. See generally Shaffer, supra note 73. 
89. See K. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY (1959). 
90. See generally Shaffer, supra note 73. 
91. Sperry, supra note 77, at 533. 
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Mind moves matter in the brain in much the same way that an organism 
moves its component organs and cells, or a molecule governs the travel 
course of its own atoms, electrons, and subnuclear elements in a chemical 
reaction. In the case of conscious experience, it is the dynamic system 
properties of high-order cerebral processes that control their component 
neural and chemical elements.92 
Sperry finds consciousness in the organization of the brain: 
[This] is not meant to imply that the properties of consciousness inter-
vene, interfere, or in any way disrupt the physiology of brain cell 
activation .... 
. . . [T]hey do supervene . ... 
. . . [T]he individual nerve impulses and associated elemental exci-
tatory events are obliged to operate within larger circuit-system configu-
rations of which they as individuals are only a part.93 
465 
The causal power that Sperry finds in consciousness is Professor 
Edward Pols' "supervening, or governing, ontic power,"94 although, as 
Pols notes, Sperry has not really worked out the causal theory.95 
Pols' theory, like Sperry's, attempts to explain situations in which 
events occur on several levels. Sperry and Pols propose that the 
higher levels influence the lower levels, but it is difficult to understand 
how there could be a causal influence. Even if events at one level 
cannot progress without progress at the other levels, that does not 
prove causation. Indeed, there is no principled way to decide whether 
level A is causing level C or vice versa. While Sperry is willing to 
allow interaction to work both ways,96 in any given interaction, one 
level event should be identifiable as the cause and the other level event 
as the effect. A theory in which it is as reasonable to declare that the 
voluntary act caused the volition as it is to declare that the volition 
caused the voluntary act does not provide the brand of causation 
sought here and may not be an advance beyond constant 
conjunction.97 
92. R. SPERRY, supra note 77, at 66. 
93. Sperry, supra note 77, at 533-34 (emphasis in original). 
94. Pols, Power and Agency, 11 INT'L PHIL. Q. 293, 307 (1971) (emphasis in original). 
95. [d. Pols' view of Sperry's theory is based on his reading of Sperry, supra note 77, but 
Sperry's later work does not present any further development of a theory of causation. Sperry cites 
Pols in R. SPERRY, supra note 77, at 67, but he does not attempt to incorporate Pols' theory. 
96. See R. SPERRY, supra note 77, at 92. 
97. That is not to say that a causal theory in which it is impossible to identify which of two 
events is the cause and which is the effect cannot have any import. Constant conjunction may serve 
as a form of explanation of either event, given the occurrence of the other event. However, given the 
role causation would seem to play in the analysis of voluntary acts, see infra notes 104-05 and ac-
companying text, this non directional causation is inadequate. 
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The Sperry-Pols theory has problems even more basic than the 
lack of direction in causality. The theory fails to establish interaction 
between levels. Pols resorts to simply asserting his conclusion, stat-
ing, "If we are to take seriously the act of the total agent we must 
simply conclude that there is an 'influence' operating between levels 
that are simultaneous .... "98 The obvious and telling objection that 
the different levels are merely alternative methods of analyzing the 
same process is not adequately addressed. Pols' response is that 
"[p]robably anyone who made an objection of that kind would not be 
especially interested in talking about levels .... "99 Irrespective of the 
interests of the objector, the objection is valid and must be countered 
before Sperry's and Pols' causation may be regarded as established. 
Consequently, at least two objections to Sperry's theory exist. 
First, his conclusion that consciousness has physical existence is not a 
scientific conclusion. This does not mean that consciousness is not 
physical, but that the conclusion is philosophical. Second, even ac-
cepting the physical existence of consciousness, causal connection has 
not been established scientifically or philosophically. Again, this does 
not mean that there is a lack of causation, but merely that, as Hume 
argues, when one looks for causation, all that may be found is con-
stant conjunction. loo 
Accordingly, the search for causation continues. Centuries of 
philosophical effort have failed to establish that a mental act or voli-
tion may cause the physical event represented by a bodily movement. 
Even the recent work of the eminent brain theorist, Dr. Sperry, 101 
fails to establish the existence of such causation. Indeed, the problem 
seems to be purely philosophical and completely irresolvable. Yet, 
allowing criminal liability to tum on the existence of volition and a 
voluntary act would appear to assume such mind-body causation.102 
The task of the next Section will be to establish a justification for the 
role of voluntary acts in criminal liability without any reliance on 
mind-body causation. 
IV. VOLITION AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 
The analysis thus far has demonstrated that there is a difference 
98. Pols, supra note 94, at 302 (emphasis in original). 
99. ld. at 303. 
100. See D. HUME, supra note 48. 
101. Roger Sperry won the 1981 Nobel Prize for Medicine for his work in brain science. 
102. See infra notes 104-05 and accompanying text. 
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between voluntary and involuntary acts. Contrary to the position es-
poused by Hart, a volition accompanies every act that would be con-
sidered voluntary and capable of serving as the physical basis for a 
criminal act. On the other hand, as even Hart would acknowledge,103 
involuntary acts are not accompanied by volitions. What remains to 
be demonstrated is that this difference should be relevant in criminal 
law. 
A. The Causation Dilemma 
The difficulty in establishing the relevance of volition lies in the 
inability to show that volition plays a causal role in the voluntary act. 
If a cause and effect relationship does not exist, then only the body 
may be shown to have been directly involved in even a voluntary act. 
Yet, some of the reluctance to bring the weight of the criminal law to 
bear against the involuntary actor is the reluctance to ascribe respon-
sibility to a person whose body alone was involved in the act. As 
Michael Moore explains: 
In law, no less than in morals, the idea of human action lies at the heart 
of ascriptions of responsibility. One is responsible only for those conse-
quences that are caused by his actions, and not for those things in which 
his body, but not his acting self, is causally implicated.104 
While this passage might be read to presume a causal relationship 
between volition and physical acts in the normal cases of voluntary 
action, it identifies an important reason-the lack of involvement of 
the mind, the acting self.-for not punishing involuntary acts. IDS Tell-
ingly, if no mind-body causation exists, this reason should extend to 
voluntary acts. 
Certainly, when there is no volition there is no causation by the 
103. See supra text accompanying note 50. 
104. Moore, supra note 70, at 1567. 
105. Other reasons have also been offered: 
The deterrent function of the criminal law would not be served by imposing sanctions for 
involuntary action, as such action cannot be deterred. Likewise, assuming revenge or retri-
bution to be a legitimate purpose of punishment, there would appear to be no basis to 
impose punishment on this basis as to those whose actions were not voluntary. Restraint 
or rehabilitation might be deemed appropriate, however, where individuals are likely to 
constitute a continuing threat to others because of their involuntary movements, but it is 
probably best to deal with this problem outside the criminal law. 
W. LAFAVE & A. SCOlT, supra note 6, § 3.2(c), at 197-98. The question of responsibility, which 
Professor Moore considers, and the problems of distinguishing voluntary and involuntary acts in 
terms of justification, when causation is not assumed, are also important to these suggested 
rationales. 
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mental aspects of the person-the "acting self." In this case, respon-
sibility can be attributed only to the body and not to the mind. Under 
these circumstances, punishment of the actor, which includes effects 
on the mental aspects of the actor, seems unjustified. How this posi-
tion may have relevance if causation between mind and body is not 
assumed remains to be established. If there is never such causation, it 
is still reasonable not to punish the involuntary act, since there was no 
mental involvement. However, if there is also no causation when 
there is volition, how can punishment of the voluntary actor be distin-
guished? His or her mind also would appear to have been uninvolved. 
Recognition of the difficulty of establishing culpability in both 
mind and body is of at least Talmudic vintage: 
Antoninus said to Rabbi: "The body and soul can both free them-
selves from judgment. Thus, the body can plead: The soul has sinned, 
[the proof being] that from the day it left me 1 lie like a dumb stone in the 
grave [powerless to do aught]. Whilst the soul can say: The body has 
sinned, [the proof being] that from the day 1 departed from it 1 fly about 
in the air like a bird [and commit no sin]." He replied, "I will tell thee a 
parable. To what may this be compared? To a human king who owned a 
beautiful orchard which contained splendid figs. Now, he appointed two 
watchmen therein, one lame and the other blind. [One day] the lame 
man said to the blind, 'I see beautiful figs in the orchard. Come take me 
upon thy shoulder, that we may procure and eat them.' So the lame 
bestrode the blind, procured and ate them. Some time after, the owner of 
the orchard came and inquired of them, 'Where are those beautiful figs?' 
The lame man replied, 'Have 1 then feet to walk with?' The blind man 
replied, 'Have 1 then eyes to see with?' What did he do? He placed the 
lame upon the blind and judged them together. So will the Holy One, 
blessed be He, bring the soul, [re]place it in the body, and judge them 
together .... "106 
This passage from the Talmud not only expresses the problem; it also 
provides the seeds of the solution. A way must be found, without 
assuming causation, to set the mind atop the body and judge them 
together. The lame man and the blind man might be brought to-
gether, in criminal terms, as accessories to each other's acts. If such 
accessory liability could be established between mind and body, then 
mind and body too could be brought together for judgment. 
A relationship between mind and body sufficient to establish cul-
pability in the mind may be found through an examination of the 
insider's view one has of one's own consciousness. Michael Gorr in 
106. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Order Nezikin, Tractate Sanhedrin, 91a-91b (I. Epstein trans. 
1935) (footnotes omitted) (insertions by Epstein). 
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considering actions, or voluntary acts, suggests that an action should 
be analyzed as "an episode of behavior experienced by the agent as 
flowing uninterruptedly from physiological activity which is felt (or at 
least is capable of being felt) as effort to produce such behavior, where 
the latter is in tum experienced as flowing uninterruptedly from an 
appropriate volition."107 From the insider's view, one's volitions are 
experienced as having causal power;108 acts seem to follow directly 
from volitions. At the very least, the mind experiences its volitions, if 
not as causing bodily events, as commands to the body which are, in 
the case of ordinary action, heeded by the body. 
B. Solicitation: Resolving the Dilemma 
This view of the mind, as issuing orders to the body, is adequate 
to establish culpability in the mind without assuming causation and 
regardless of whether or not the body actually receives the orders. 
/ The culpability involved is that found in solicitation or attempted so-
licitation. 109 Under the Model Penal Code, 
[a] person is guilty of solicitation to commit a crime if with the purpose 
of promoting or facilitating its commission he commands, encourages or 
requests another person to engage in specific conduct which would consti-
tute such crime or an attempt to commit such crime or which would 
establish his complicity in its commission or attempted commission.110 
107. Gorr, supra note 76, at 11. 
108. While it may be argued that there can be no direct experience of causation but only of 
events from which causation is inferred, the problem is not unique to the experience of mind-body 
causation. If there were mind-body causation, it would, in fact, seem to be the species of causation 
that would be most accessible to experience. 
109. The argument presented will not establish CUlpability in any absolute sense, but it estab-
lishes a sort of relative CUlpability. Just as mathematicians and logicians establish relative consis-
tency of logical systems by showing that if set theory is consistent then so is the system in question, 
see, e.g., A. HAMILTON, LOGIC FOR MATHEMATICIANS 121-23 (1978), CUlpability on the part of the 
mind is established if culpability attaches to the normal case of solicitation. For absolute consistency 
the logician must show that set theory is consistent. Here, an absolute showing of culpability re-
quires a showing that culpability properly attaches to the normal cases of solicitation. The easy 
argument may be made that what is made criminal is culpable, but that will not serve the role 
required here. In seeking philosophical justification, a moral argument establishing CUlpability for 
solicitation is required. 
The drafters of the Model Penal Code provide an argument for culpability in solicitation: 
Purposeful solicitation presents dangers calling for preventive intervention and is suffi-
ciently indicative of a disposition towards criminal activity to call for liability. Moreover, 
the fortuity that the person solicited does not agree to commit or attempt to commit the 
incited crime plainly should not relieve the solicitor of liability, when otherwise he would 
be a conspirator or an accomplice. 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.02 comment 1 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960). 
IlO. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.02(1) (1962) (emphasis added). 
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In addition to solicitation itself being criminal, the Model Penal Code 
provides that the solicitor is an accomplice of the actor, is legally ac-
countable for his actions, and is guilty of the offense committed by the 
actor. 111 
Even assuming that the mind's orders are actually transmitted to 
and received by the body, there are difficulties in applying the Model 
Penal Code definition of solicitation, which envisions two persons in-
teracting, to this situation in which the two entities involved are the 
mental and physical aspects of the same person. Obviously, the defi-
nition cannot be applied literally. The statement that a "person" is 
guilty if he commands "another person" to engage in criminal con-
duct puts the mind-body situation beyond the scope of the subsection. 
However, the present situation need not fit the definition with any 
literal precision. A basis on which to establish culpability in the mind 
of an actor for his or her body's voluntary acts is sought, without 
assuming that the mind's volition caused the acts. That basis may be 
established by analogy to the normal forms of solicitation. Just as one 
person is culpable for soliciting the criminal behavior of another per-
son, so the mind may be viewed as culpable for soliciting the criminal 
behavior of the body, even if that solicitation-the volition-does not 
cause the behavior. 
A somewhat more serious problem is raised by the fact that, in 
the case of solicitation by one person of another, an act of solicitation 
is required. As with any crime, evil intent alone will not suffice. 
There must be an act of communication, most often a speaking of 
words, but frequently a writing. 112 In the case of solicitation of the 
body by the mind, there is no such spoken word nor written commu-
nication. However, neither is there merely evil intent. The volition 
that accompanies a voluntary act is more than a positive disposition 
toward a particular result or a hope that something will occur. It is 
the doing of all that the mind is capable of doing toward bringing 
about that end. The forming of a volition goes beyond ruminating 
with approval on a future state of affairs and should suffice to estab-
lish culpability in the mind as well as in the body of the actor. 
If, in addition to refusing to assume any mind-body causation, 
one also refuses to assume that the mind's commands are even re-
ceived by the body, culpability may still be established. According to 
the Model Penal Code, "It is immaterial . . . that the actor fails to 
111. [d. § 2.06. 
112. W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 6, § 6.1(c), at 491. 
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communicate with the person he solicits to commit a crime if his con-
duct was designed to effect such communication."113 The commen-
tary to the Code supports this position by citing existing law making 
solicitation criminal, even if the communication fails to reach the in-
tended party. However, when the communication fails, the defendant 
was generally prosecuted for attempted solicitation. 114 The Model Pe-
113. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.02(2) (1962). 
114. The Model Penal Code finds support in a series of older cases. See, e.g., People v. Bloom, 
149 A.D. 295, 133 N.Y.S. 708 (1912); Rex v. Krause, 19 L.T.R. 238 (1902); Regina v. Banks, 12 Cox 
Crim. Cas. 393 (Assizes 1873); Queen v. Fox, 19 W.R. 109 (Ire. C.C.R. 1870). For another discus-
sion of the charge of attempted solicitation, see R. v. Crichton, [1915] S.A.L.R. 1 (C.C.R.); Regina v. 
Ransford, 31 L.T.R. 488 (Cr. Cas. Res. 1874); Rex v. Cope, 16 Crim. App. 77 (1921). The commen-
tary also notes that it was considered doubtful that an uncommunicated communication constituted 
solicitation in Ransford and in Horton v. Mead, [1913] 1 K.B. 154 (1912). See also MODEL PENAL 
CODE § 5.02(2) comment (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960). 
Depending how the comment and the cases are read, the cases may not provide as strong sup-
port as the Code comment indicates. For example, in Bloom, the defendant solicited an individual to 
incite a third party to give false testimony. The defendant was charged with an attempt to incite that 
third party. The court, citing Krause, stated, "It may be that •.. an undelivered letter would not 
sustain an indictment of inciting, but it would sustain an attempt to incite." Bloom, 133 N.Y.S. at 
711. Since the charge had been an attempt to incite, the information was adequate in that it did "not 
require that the solicitation should be brought to the person to be finally reached." Id. While not 
ruling on a charge of solicitation based on an uncommunicated command or request, the court did 
not foreclose the possibility. 
Krause involved letters written and posted by the defendant proposing to the intended recipient 
that he murder a third party. The prosecution did not prove that either letter reached the addressee. 
The prosecutor charged that the defendant "unlawfully [did] solicit, ... persuade, ... endeavor to 
persuade, [and] propose ... murder." Krause, 18 L.T.R. at 238. Attempt to commit the same 
misdemeanors was also charged. The court had no difficulty with the attempt charge, but as to the 
solicitation charges wrote that "there must be some communication to the person in order to consti-
tute the statutory offence." Id. at 243. While "it is not necessary to show that the mind of a man has 
been affected ... there must be some evidence of communication." Id. 
In Banks, one of the two defendants wrote and posted a letter to the other suggesting the mur-
der of the child to which the latter was expecting to give birth. The letter was intercepted by the 
expectant mother's landlady. Banks, 12 Cox Crim. Cas. at 396. The court held that if the passages 
of the intercepted letter were serious, deliberate solicitations, they might find the defendant guilty of 
an attempt to propose the murder of the infant. Id. at 399. So, while the court's wording indicates 
that the passages of the undelivered letter could be solicitations, the court's summation to the jury 
indicated that the proper verdict, ifit found the requisite facts, was guilty to the charge of an attempt 
to propose. 
Fox also involved an unreceived letter. The defendant was charged with soliciting and endeav-
oring to persuade the intended recipient to murder a third party. Due to poor hand writing, the 
letter was misdelivered to a police officer with a vaguely similar name. Fox, 19 W.R. at 109. The 
defendant's conviction was overturned on appeal with the court in general agreement that solicita-
tion must involve communication. There was disagreement over whether the charge of endeavoring 
to persuade also required communication, but that disagreement does not support the Model Penal 
Code position on uncommunicated solicitation. Its discussion would have more bearing on the ques-
tion of attempted solicitation. 
In Crichton, a pregnant woman asked the prospective father to provide a drug that would in-
duce an abortion. He posted the chemical and sent the woman a letter to the effect that he was 
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nal Code, however, does not treat attempted solicitation as a crime 
distinct from solicitation. II5 Attempted solicitation is solicitation: 
The crucial manifestation of dangerousness . . . lies in the endeavor to 
communicate the incriminating message to another person, it being 
wholly fortuitous whether such message was actually received. Liability 
should attach, therefore, even though the message is not received by the 
contemplated recipient .... 116 
Hence, under the Model Penal Code view, it need not be as-
sumed either that the mind's volition causes the body's physical act or 
that the volition is even communicated to the body in order to estab-
lish culpability in the mind. It is enough that the mind formed the 
volition. II7 The mind is guilty of solicitation, is the accomplice of the 
sending the requested drug. Her father intercepted the letter and then obtained the parcel from the 
post office. The defendant was charged with "attempting to incite an attempt to commit abortion." 
Crichton, [1915] S.A.L.R. at 1. He was convicted and the conviction was upheld. The court ap-
peared unconcerned by any questions arising from the fact that the letter was undelivered, and the 
only issue on appeal was whether the charge could stand when the inciting letter was in response to 
an invitation by the woman the defendant was accused of having attempted to incite. 
In Ransford, the defendant had written a letter to a school boy suggesting that they engage in an 
unnatural sexual relationship. The intended recipient received the letter but did not open it, perhaps 
due to the nature of two earlier letters from the defendant, and turned it over to school authorities. 
Ransford, 31 L.T.R. at 490. The court was in accord that the defendant could be convicted on those 
facts, of an attempt to solicit, but some doubt was expressed as to whether a charge of solicitation 
could have been sustained. ld. at 491. 
In Cope, the defendant's letters, which were read as attempting to procure an act of indecency 
with another male, were intercepted by the addressee's mother, who turned them over to the police. 
Cope, 16 Crim. App. at 78. The court, based on Ransford and Banks, rejected the appellant's argu-
ment that an attempt required that the letters be received and read by the addressee. 
Horton may actually provide more support for the Model Penal Code position than is indicated 
in the comment. Defendant there, while in several lavatories and on the street, "smiled in the faces 
of gentlemen, pursed his lips, and wriggled his body." Horton, [1913] 1 K.B. at 155. There was, 
however, no evidence that anyone other than two police officers watching the defendant even noticed 
the defendant's alleged solicitations. The court refused to rule that there could not be a conviction 
without proof that someone had seen the solicitation. ld. at 156. While some attempt was made to 
distinguish cases in which some physical interference with communication kept the attempted solici-
tation from being received from this case in which the solicitation was apprehended by the senses of 
the recipients, though perhaps without conveying the intended message, one judge stated flatly that 
he did not think it necessary for conviction that a solicitation reach the mind of the person whose 
solicitation was intended. ld. at 158-59 (pickford, J.). 
Whether or not the case law supports the Model Penal Code position as strongly as the drafters 
indicate, the strength of the independent argument they offer is unaffected. That argument, see supra 
note 109, provides adequate support for § 5.02(2). 
115. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.02(2) comment 5 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960). 
116. ld. 
117. Under the analysis presented, the mind's forming of the volition is analogous to normal 
criminal solicitation. This raises the interesting question of whether the paralytic who tries (that is, 
has the volition) unsuccessfully to pull the trigger of a weapon placed in his hand and thereby kill 
someone is nonetheless guilty of solicitation to murder. Fortunately for the approach espoused here, 
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body, and shares the body's liability for its physical acts. Even under 
the weaker, attempted solicitation view, the mind is guilty of at-
tempted solicitation. There is a culpability in the mental aspect of the 
person that is not present in the case of the volitionless, involuntary 
act, and it is still a culpability that does not depend on assuming 
mind-body causation. 
This approach presents one last problem. The cases in the Model 
Penal Code comment on liability for uncommunicated solicitation 118 
were all cases in which the communication might have reached the 
intended recipient. A situation in which it was impossible for the so-
licitation to reach the intended recipient might call for a different 
conclusion. 
Furthermore, the argument that the endeavor to communicate is 
a sufficient manifestation of dangerousness seems to rest on the propo-
sition that liability should not tum on the fortuity of whether or not 
the communication is actually received. 1l9 Again, it appears that the 
communication could possibly have been received. 
For example, if a letter written in English addressed to an Eng-
lish speaking person and commending or encouraging a crime were 
never received, the Code would still clearly find liability for solicita-
tion. Less clear is how the Code would approach the case of a letter 
written in Sanskrit and sent to a person who speaks only English or 
the case of a page full of symbols which were meaningless but which 
the writer believed would cause the recipient to commit a particular 
crime. Since it might be argued that the failure of the mind to com-
municate with the body is more similar to one of the last two exam-
ples than the misdelivered letter, the Code's approach to the latter 
examples must be considered. 
The Model Penal Code treats failures to communicate as at-
tempted solicitations, and hence, as solicitations. Section 5.02(2) finds 
liability for a failed communication, so long as the communicative 
"conduct was designed to effect such communication."12o Further-
more, the cases cited as support for section 5.02(2) are mostly cases in 
the answer is no. The mind should be viewed as being equally culpable with that of the 
nonparalyzed murderer, and the mind's culpability is complete with its act of forming a volition. 
However, when viewed from the point of view of the whole person, there is no act on the part of the 
body and culpability may not attach. 
118. See supra note 114. 
119. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.02(2) comment 5 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960), quoted supra 
text accompanying note 116. 
120. [d. § 5.02(2) (1962). CJ id. § 5.01(1)(b) (person guilty of attempt, if "when causing a 
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which the charge had been attempted solicitation. 121 The Code treats 
these attempted solicitations as actual solicitations for purposes of im-
posing criminal liability. 122 Consequently, the key to deciding how to 
handle Sanskrit or jibberish messages lies in the Model Penal Code 
approach to attempt. 
In the section on criminal attempt, the Code states that a person 
is guilty of attempt if he: 
(a) purposely engages in conduct which would constitute the crime 
if the attendant circumstances were as he believes them to be; or 
(b) when causing a particular result is an element of the crime, does 
or omits to do anything with the purpose of causing or with the belie/that 
it will cause such result without further conduct on his part; or 
(c) purposely does or omits to do anything which, under the circum-
stances as he believes them to be, is an act or omission constituting a 
substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his com-
mission 0/ the crime. 123 
The comment to the section explains that the subsection quoted is 
designed "to eliminate the defense of impossibility."124 Accordingly, 
the defense that a Sanskrit letter could not be an attempted solicita-
tion, and hence a solicitation, because it was impossible for the recipi-
ent to read the letter, must be rejected if the sender believed that the 
recipient could read Sanskrit. 125 
The same analysis appears to require the rejection of the impossi-
bility defense for the jibberish letter, so long as the sender believed 
that the missive would in fact communicate his intended message. 
However, the Code also allows a court to reduce the grade of an of-
fense or even dismiss a prosecution when the conduct involved is "so 
inherently unlikely to result or culminate in the commission of a 
crime that neither such conduct nor the actor presents a public dan-
ger warranting [an attempt charge]."126 Hence, the sending of the 
particular result is an element of the crime, [he] does ... anything with the purpose of causing or 
with the belief that it will cause such result without further conduct on his part"). 
121. See supra note 114. 
122. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.02(2) (1962). 
123. ld. § 5.01(1) (emphasis added). 
124. ld. § 5.01 comment 5 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960). 
125. The same result would obtain under non-Code analysis. The impossibility claim is clearly 
one of factual, as opposed to legal, impossibility, and factual impossibility is generally not a defense 
to attempt. See, e.g., W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 6, § 6.3(a)(2), at 512 ("All courts are in 
agreement that what is usually referred to as 'factual impossibility' is no defense to a charge of 
attempt."). 
126. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05(2) (1962). 
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jibberish letter might not be an attempt. 
Returning to the immediate problem, the mind experiences itself 
as commanding the body, and in fact, even as causing the movements 
of the body. Thus, under the circumstances as the actor-the mind-
believes them to be, the attempt to communicate with the body will 
result in a communication. That mind-body communication may not 
be factually possible will not serve as a defense to attempted solicita-
tion. The mind is guilty of the attempt, and hence, of the solicitation. 
Only if mind-body communication were not only factually impossible, 
but also inherently impossible, would the Model Penal Code dismiss 
the attempt charge.127 The existence of philosophical dispute should 
not establish that inherent impossibility. In fact, the continued vital-
ity of nondualist theories of mind and body weighs against the claim 
of inherent impossibility.128 It cannot be claimed that mind-body 
communication, while it may be factually impossible, is "so inherently 
unlikely ... that neither such conduct nor the actor presents a public 
danger .... "129 When volition exists, the mind shares the CUlpability 
of the body, even if the mind did not serve to cause those acts and 
even if the mind is incapable of actually communicating to the body 
its desires.130 
The culpability of the mind in a voluntary act justifies the ascrip-
tion of responsibility to the whole person. Since every voluntary act 
involves volition, there is participation, at least on the level of an un-
communicated solicitation, of the mental aspects of the person, which 
is lacking in the case of the volitionless, involuntary act. With the 
whole person involved, the person may be viewed as criminal in a 
sense in which the person is not criminal when only the body is in-
volved. Under the theory presented here, that ascription of criminal 
responsibility does not depend on an assumption of mind-body causa-
tion. Hence, even without establishing causation, a role for volition in 
criminal law may be established. 131 
127. See id. 
128. See supra note 74. 
129. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05(2) (1962). 
130. The causation problem discussed in this Article differs from that recently discussed by 
Michael Moore. See Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1091 (1985). While 
Professor Moore discusses "no action" excuses, his main concern focuses on the problems of causal 
influences outside the actor's control. Such influences would normally operate in such a way that a 
mental act of the actor can be found somewhere in the causal chain. Only in the "no voluntary 
action" defense is there the claim that the actor's mind was not a part of the causal chain at all. It is 
the justification of that defense that has been at issue here. 
131. The approach taken may seem to place the cart before the horse in that, while personal 
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v. CONCLUSION 
Contrary to H. L. A. Hart's VIew, volitIOn plays a role m volun-
tary acts that IS Illissmg m the case of mvoluntary acts. Furthermore, 
that role IS adequate to Justify the finding of cflIllinal liability on the 
part of the voluntary actor, while not holding the mvoluntary actor 
liable. The distmctIOn may be made WIthout assummg a partIcular 
solutIOn to the Illind-body problem by establishmg accessory liability, 
through solicItatIOn, on the part of the Illind for the body's phYSICal 
acts. In that way, WIthout establishIng any direct partIcIpatIOn of the 
mmd m bodily events, culpability may be established m the mmd, and 
both mmd and body may be seen as cnmmal, when the act IS volun-
tary. Thus, while the mmd-body problem may not be philosophIcally 
resolvable, the cflIllinal law's ImputatIon of liability for the acts of 
another removes the difficultIes presented by the mmd-body problem. 
One may, of course, be opposed to the ImputatIon of cnIllinal 
liability on the baSIS of bemg an accessory, but that IS a separate Issue. 
It has been shown that, if cnmmal accessory liability IS accepted, the 
voluntary act requIrement need not rest on an assumed SolutIon to the 
mmd-body problem. Those who object to accessory liability may still 
argue that volitIon plays no role m the ImputatIon of cnIllinal liabil-
Ity, but they will do so only if they are troubled by the mmd-body 
problem. However, the voluntary act reqUIrement may now be ac-
cepted by all those who are untroubled by the Illind-body problem as 
well as by those who are troubled by the mmd-body problem but ac-
cept accessory liability Thus, anyone who WIshes to argue that voli-
tIon plays no role m cnmmallaw must now also argue that accessory 
liability IS unacceptable. 
liability of the pnnclpalls more basiC than accessory liability, accessory liability concepts were used 
to explam the personal liability of the pnnclpal. But, the problem addressed was that presented by 
the fact that liability on the part of the mmd appears to depend on a certaIn cause and effect relation-
ship. Accessory liability was presented to show that cnmmalliability may attach even when there IS 
no phYSical cause and effect relationship between an actor's (accessory's) act and the cnme. Thus, 
the accessory-pnnclpal relationship served as an analogy to explam the liability of the mmd on an 
accessory-like theory. 
